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Abstract— In recent years, a large scale of various wireless
sensor networks have been deployed for basic scientific works.
Massive data loss is so common that there is a great demand for
data recovery. While data recovery methods fulfil the requirement
of accuracy, the potential privacy leakage caused by them
concerns us a lot. Thus the major challenge of sensory data
recovery is the issue of effective privacy preservation. Existing
algorithms can either accomplish accurate data recovery or solve
privacy issue, yet no single design is able to address these two
problems simultaneously. Therefore in this paper, we propose
a novel approach Privacy-Preserving Compressive Sensing with
Multi-Attribute Assistance (PPCS-MAA). It applies PPCS scheme
to sensory data recovery, which can effectively encrypts sensory
data without decreasing accuracy, because it maintains the
homomorphic obfuscation property for compressive sensing. In
addition, multiple environmental attributes from sensory datasets
usually have strong correlation so that we design a Multi-
Attribute Assistance (MAA) component to leverage this feature
for better recovery accuracy. Combining PPCS with MAA, the
novel recovery scheme can provide reliable privacy with high
accuracy.
Firstly, based on two real datasets, IntelLab and GreenOrbs,
we reveal the inherited low-rank features as the ground truth
and find such multi-attribute correlation. Secondly, we develop
a PPCS-MAA algorithm to preserve privacy and optimize the
recovery accuracy. Thirdly, the results of real data-driven simu-
lations show that the algorithm outperforms the existing solutions.
Keywords—Data recovery, privacy-preserving, multi-attribute,
wireless sensor networks
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) [1],
its applications become more and more widespread. There is a
great demand for big data. We target at an important scenario
that wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [2], as basic equipment,
have been widely deployed to gather various sensory attributes
from cooperative sensor nodes. These big sensor data have
promising applications extensively adopted in military, civilian,
medical treatment and commercial field. The origin data from
sensor nodes are usually incomplete, which need to be recover.
However, the recovery needs computing resources thus the
missing data to process are transferred to the sink nodes
or the server, during which the data packet may leak out.
As some data exposes users’ daily activities or confidential
information, the privacy issue is a major concern in data
recovery. Thus the major challenge of sensory data recovery
is the issue of effective privacy preservation. In the practical
application scenario, such as intrusion detection in battlefields,
searching and rescuing systems, item tracking, infrastructure
and environment monitoring, and indoor localization, valuable
data demand not only accurate recovery but also effective
protection against being stolen and stalked. Therefore we
are motivated to design an efficient method for recovering
incomplete data with privacy preservation.
For massive missing data recovery, there are plenty of
classic missing data estimation methods such as KNN [3],
DT [4], etc. These methods avoid the data leakage by re-
quiring no data exchange. However, their recovery accuracy
is usually limited. Currently, compressive sensing (CS) [5] is
an advanced recovery technique with promising performance
of effective estimation in mature applications. Yet, its data
transmission and requirement for a computing server degrade
privacy. For privacy, existing works are dummification and
obfuscation. Although the two procedures protect privacy to
some extent, they pollute the original data, decreasing the
recovery accuracy. To improve the privacy, recently, another
privacy method is presented in the trajectory field, namely K-
vector perturbation (KVP) [6]. The main idea of KVP is to
use a private key to perturb a user’s trajectory with K other
trajectories while maintaining the homomorphic obfuscation
property. Combining with compressive sensing, this novel
encryption approach applied in the trajectory recovery is called
privacy-preserving compressive sensing (PPCS) [6], which
simultaneously tackles the challenges of privacy-preserving
and recovery accuracy.
In addition, a large quantity of real-world sensor data
share linear correlation among multiple attributes, which can
be used as the supplement of the internal correlations and
improve the accuracy of the estimation. This is the so-called
Multi-Attributes Assistance (MAA) method. In commercial
WSNs, data from some kinds of expensive sensors (e.g PM2.5,
CO2) are valuable and have something to do with data trading,
but may cost too much for processing, like using PPCS for
privacy. Thus with MAA, we can also bring benefits to cost
control or data trading. Motivated by the these observations, we
propose the novel PPCS with MAA approach which conquers
all the mentioned challenges.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
details about privacy-preseving recovery model and MAA
statement with real-world data verification. Section III de-
scribes the procedures of our approach and gives an algo-
rithm for encryption, multi-attribute assistant data recovery
and decryption. Section IV introduces an evaluation of PPCS-
MAA and implements a real-world data-driven experiment.
Conclusions are made in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION/STATEMENT
In this section, we introduce the basic notations of
the mathematical representation, privacy-preserving recovery
model, multi-attribute assistance model, and the formal defini-
tion of our problem.
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Fig. 1: Privacy-preserving recovery model.
A. Notations
In this paper, scalars are denoted by lowercase letters, e.g.,
n; vectors are denoted by boldface lowercase letters, e.g., x
and the transpose is denoted as x>; matrices are denoted by
boldface capital letters, e.g.,X; estimated matrices are denoted
as X̂; encrypted matrices are denoted as X. We denote the `1
norm of matrix as ‖X‖1 =
∑
i,j |X(i, j)|; and the Frobenius
norm of a matrix is defined as ‖X‖F =
(∑
i,jX(i, j)
2
)1/2
.
‘XY ’ represents the matrix multiplication of two matrices,
while ‘X ·Y ’ represents the element-wise multiplication. Then
we give our definitions of matrices as following:
Environment Matrix (EM): is an n × t matrix defined as
A. Considering multiple attributes, it is extended to Ak =
(aij)n×t, k = 1, 2, ..., s. Ak represents that the entire values
of s attributes from a set of n nodes in t time stamps are
successfully gathered, i.e., ideally no data loss.
Binary Index Matrix (BIM): is an n × t matrix, which
indicates whether the data points at the corresponding positions
in the EM are missing. BIM is defined by B as:
B = (bij)n×t =
{
0 if aij is missing.
1 otherwise.
Sensed Matrix (SM): is an n × t matrix, which records
the sampled attributes collected from WSNs. Due to the
phenomena of data missing, elements in SM are either aij
measured by sensors or 0. Thereby, an SM is the incomplete
EM, which is defined as: S = B ·A.
Recovered Matrix (RM): is generated by interpolating the
missing data in the SM to approximate the complete matrix
EM. We use Â to denote RM.
Compressive Sensing (CS): is an efficient recovery ap-
proach utilized to estimated missing values in SM. The CS
procedure is denoted by fCS , thus, Â = fCS(S).
B. Privacy-Preserving Recovery Model
We consider a system consisting of two types of mobile
users: public and private users. Public users are willing to share
their data but private ones are the complete opposite. We illus-
trate the privacy-preserving recovery model as shown in Fig.
1. Then, we consider the accurate and privacy-preserving data
recovery problem. The standard CS meets our requirements,
but the objective of avoiding data exposure is unfortunately
contrary to the basic requirement of CS data transmission. To
address this dilemma, the PPCS scheme is proposed in the
trajectory field. We elaborately apply PPCS to sensory data
recovery. The procedures in detail is described in Section III.
C. Multi-Attribute Assistance Model
Analyzing the real research datasets of WSNs, we aim at
discovering some features of common sensory data contribut-
ing to our data recovery approach. For instance, the datasets
from IntelLab [7] and GreenOrbs [8] are studied. The format
of those data packet can be simplified as following:
SensorID Time Attribute 1 Attribute 2 ...
Our target is to recover the complete series of these
attributes matrices from their sampled subsets of entries which
represent the incomplete data gathered by WSNs. We denote
it as Multi-Attribute Data Recovery (MADR) problem. In this
case, it is essential for us to mine the relations among mul-
tiple attributes. That means multiple matrices are evaluated
conjointly. To simplify, we discuss the MADR problem in the
condition of two attributes as an example. The basic analysis
and evaluation of our approach can be easily extended into the
condition of more attributes.
D. Problem Statement/Formulation
1) Ground Truth: After studying the original datasets gath-
ered from GreenOrbs and IntelLab, we reveal that the data loss
rates reach 35% and 23%. In order to guarantee the integrity
of ground truth, we perform preprocessing method on the raw
data to filter and construct small but completed matrices as the
”ground truth” matrices, which considers the maximization of
the integrality in both time and space. From each dataset we
extract subsets of two attributes: humidity and light.
2) Low-rank Property: As a matter of fact, there exists a
strong correlation among the readings of neighboring sensors
or time periods. Therefore, we can analyze the inherent struc-
ture or redundancy of datasets to ensure the low-rank property
of matrices, which is the requirement for our fundamental CS
operation. We adopt the singular value decomposition (SVD).
According to SVD theorem, an n × t matrix X has the
decomposition as:
X = UΛV > =
min(n,t)∑
i=1
σiuiv
>
i , (1)
where U and V are two unitary matrices with size n×n and
t×t. (·)> is the transpose operator, and Λ is an n×t diagonal
matrix including all singular values σi of X . The singular
values σi are sorted as σi ≥ σi+1, i = 1, ..., min(n, t), where
min(n, t) is the number of singular values. The rank of the
matrix X , denoted by r, represents the number of its non-
zero singular values. The low-rank property is stated when
r  min(n, t). Moreover, the matrix can be considered to be
approximate low-rank, if the top-r̂ has a good approximation
of the total singular values as:
∑r̂
i=1 σi ≈
∑min(n,t)
i=1 σi.
3) Multi-Attribute Correlation: Here we consider solving
MADR problem. Formally, when s = 2, multi-attribute data
recovery problem is defined as: Give SMs S1, S2, find the
solution as Â1 and Â2, i.e.,
minimize: ‖Â1 −A1‖F + µ‖Â2 −A2‖F ,
subject to: B1 · Â1 = B1 ·A1,
B2 · Â2 = B2 ·A2,
(2)
where ‖·‖F expresses the Frobenius norm. Here we add
parameter µ as a tradeoff coefficient in order to avoid the
overshadow problem between two matrices, because of the
inequality in the magnitudes of attributes.
Joint Sparse Decomposition (JSD) [9] is the approach to
jointly dividing multi-attribute matrices into a public compo-
nent of matrix U and two private components of matrices
∆1, ∆2. Suppose two attributes A1 = (a
(i)
1 , ..., a
(i)
1 ) and
A2 = (a
(i)
2 , ..., a
(i)
2 ). For both column vector a
(i)
1 and a
(i)
2 ,
the goal is to split them into:
a
(i)
1 = u
(i) + δ
(i)
1 ,
a
(i)
2 = u
(i) + δ
(i)
2 ,
u(i) = Ψv(i),
(3)
where u(i) is the public component, which is the multiplication
of a wavelet basis Ψ and a sparse vector v(i). The private
components are respectively represented by δ(i)1 and δ
(i)
2 .
Considering the CS theory, (v(i), δ(i)1 , δ
(i)
2 ) are obtained by
solving an `1-norm minimization problem as following:
θ̂ = argmin‖θ‖1, s.t. a = Hθ. (4)
where θ = (v(i)>, δ(i)>1 , δ
(i)>
2 )
>, a = (a(i)>1 , a
(i)>
2 )
> and
H = (Ψ, I,0; Ψ,0, I). Then u(i)>, δ(i)>1 and δ
(i)>
2 are
calculated from θ. Utilizing JSD to every column vector, A1
and A2 are decomposed as:
A1 = U + ∆1,
A2 = U + ∆2.
(5)
III. SOLUTIONS
A. PPCS Approach
To conquer the challenge of privacy issue in classic CS,
we introduce the simple and feasible sensor data recovery
approach Privacy-Preserving Compressive Sensing (PPCS) in
this section. The suggested approach consists of three steps.
Generally, they can be sequentially executed as encryption,
recovery and decryption.
1) Encryption: Define fen(·) as the encryption function.
With a sensed matrix S, the encrypted matrix is denoted
as S = fen(S),. The encryptor in detail is stated as
K-Vector Perturbation(KVP), which is described as follows:
Firstly, K public vectors D1, D2, ..., DK are randomly
downloads from all public vectors at the server or just ran-
domly initialized, which is used to construct the encrypted
i-th row vector Si. Then, a length-(K + 1) random vector
< ψi,0, ψi,1, ..., ψi,K > is generated as a private key. Any key
satisfies ψi,j ∈ (0, 1). The encryption operator is represented
with the public vectors and the private key as:
Si = (ψi,0Si + ψi,1D1 + · · · + ψi,KDK) ·Bi. (6)
Intuitively, the length of private key dominates the diffi-
culty of decryption and the value of K decides the privacy
preservation strength.
2) Recover the encrypted data: After gathering the en-
crypted components, the encrypted matrix S is an n×t matrix.
Then, for recovering, CS operator fcs(·) is applied to S and
the recovery matrix is perceived as Â. Simply, we adopt the
typical CS recovery scheme, which is processed as follows:
Â is separated into L and R partial matrices by the SVD-
like factorization.
Â = UΛV > = LR>, (7)
where L = UΛ1/2, R = V Λ1/2. Then L and R matrices are
estimated by
min(‖B · (LR>)− S‖2F + λ(‖L‖2F + ‖R>‖2F )), (8)
where the Lagrange parameter λ serves as a tunable tradeoff
between rank approximation and accuracy fitness. The solution
of L and R can be attained by iterative computing. To
summarize, the operator fcs is equal to solve Â = LR> by
L and R obtained from Eqn.(8) with input S.
3) Decryption: When the recovery procedure is done, the
recovered matrix denoted as Â can be delivered to local
decryption operation as fde(·). Also, the operation obtains the
decrypted and estimated matrix Â as
Âi = fde(Âi) = (Âi−(ψi,1D1+ · · · +ψi,KDK) /ψi,0). (9)
Finally Â can be obtained by the union of every i-th
row vector as the matrix Âi. Considering the local decryption
and the private key, the privacy of Â is safely preserved. In
addition, ψi,0 is a special component in private key. As fde
operation in Eqn.(9) indicates, ψi,0 determines the weight of
the original vectors in the encrypted vector. For one thing, ψi,0
cannot be too small, because under this condition, the weight
of Âi hidden in the encrypted Âi is too small, which leads
to a poor recovery accuracy. For another, ψi,0 cannot be too
large. With ψi,0 close to 1, Âi = Âi, which losses the strength
of privacy preservation. Empirically, ψi,0 is set in the range of
[0.2, 0.8].
B. Multi-Attribute Assistance
1) Normalization: In order to tackle the issue of the matrix
overshadowing problem, the parameter µ is supplemented in
Eqn.(2). However, it is difficult to find the best value of µ
due to the indistinct relationship between A1 and A2. So we
simply normalize each matrix and set µ = 1. The real maximum
value is possible to loss, hence we adopt the maximum value
in gathered datasets instead.
2) Low-Rank Matrix Approximation: The problem in
Eqn.(2), restricted by variables in two matrices, is difficult to
solve in closure form. Since the inherited low-rank features
are stated in Section II, we convert this problem to a rank
minimization problem as:
min(rank(Âi)), s.t. Si = Bi ·Ai. (10)
However, the rank calculation rank(·) is not convex. We
adopt SVD-like factorization as Eqn.(7). Thus min(rank(Â))
is also solvable by figuring L and R, which is redefined as
min(‖L‖2F + ‖R>‖2F ). (11)
3) Compressive Sensing-based Joint Matrix Decomposi-
tion: There is still a problem against us that no connection
is established between A1 and A2 in Eqn.(11). To exploit the
inherent correlation, we apply JSD to our CS operation. Thus,
the approximation Â1 and Â2 are separated by JSD as Eqn.(5).
Since Û , ∆̂1, ∆̂2 inherit the low-rank feature, the problem is
reformulated as:
minimize: ‖Û‖∗ + ‖∆̂1‖∗ + ‖∆̂2‖∗,
subject to: B1 · (Û + ∆̂1) = B1 ·A1,
B2 · (Û + ∆̂2) = B2 ·A2.
(12)
Moreover, we use SVD-like factorization to minimize
objective in Eqn.(12), which is rewritten as:∑
L
‖Lj‖2F +
∑
R
‖Rj‖2F , j = 1, 2, U. (13)
where LU , L1, L2 are n × r matrices and RU , R1, R2 are
t× r matrices. Û = LUR>U , ∆̂1 = L1R>1 and ∆̂2 = L2R>2 .
To avoid overfitting, we adopt the Lagrange multiplier method
which converts the problem to a non-stationary optimization
problem, i.e.,
minimize: ‖B1 · (LUR>U +L1R>1 )− S1‖2F
+‖B2 · (LUR>U +L2R>2 )− S2‖2F
+λ(
∑
L
‖Lj‖2F +
∑
R
‖Rj‖2F ).
(14)
This equation is the core of MAA component, which can
be solved because 1) B1, B2, S1, S2 are known; 2) each
square of the Frobenius norm is non-negative; 3) the optimal
value can be reached by minimizing all non-negative parts to
zero. Hence, Â1 and Â2 can be estimated by Eqn.(14) and
Eqn.(5). Combining Eqn.(14) with Eqn.(8), we propose our
novel approach as following:
PPCS-MAA is to recover encoded multiple (two as exam-
ple) attributes-based sensory matrices according to:
minimize: ‖B1 · (LUR>U +L1R>1 )− S1‖2F
+‖B2 · (LUR>U +L2R>2 )− S2‖2F
+λ(
∑
L
‖Lj‖2F +
∑
R
‖Rj‖2F ).
(15)
Extension: The MAA component suits the condition of
more attributes as well. For example, if we measure k attributes
in one WSN, denoted as A1, A2, ..., Ak, the minimization
objective in Eqn.(12) is rewritten as following:
‖Û‖∗ + ‖∆̂1‖∗ + ‖∆̂2‖∗ + · · ·+ ‖∆̂k‖∗. (16)
This equation can be solved by the similar method of the
two-attribute case above, which is concretely shown in Alg.1.
C. Algorithm
Firstly, we do initialization and preprocess the dataset with
sampling the EMs by BMs respectively. Secondly, we generate
the vectors of KVP approach to perform the fen(·) operation.
Thirdly, we present the core calculations of MAA component
to solve Eqn.(15) here. Fourthly, we obtain the RMs and
execute fde(·) to complete the output. The algorithm solves the
Algorithm 1 PPCS-MAA
Input: SMs S1, S2 with BIMs B1, B2, parameters λ, r, k.
Main Procedure:
1: Initialize the public and private key D,Ψ.
2: Normalize the observed matrices S1,S2.
3: Encrypt S1 ← [S1D]Ψ; S2 ← [S2D]Ψ.
4: Initialize random LU ,L1,L2,R1,R2.
5: Objective y ← Eqn.(15).
6: while y is not converged do
7: X1 ← S1 −B1 · (L1R>1 );X2 ← S2 −B2 · (L2R>2 );
8: R̂U ← crossInverse(B1,B2,LU , λ, r,X1,X2)
9: L̂U ← crossInverse(B>1 ,B>2 ,RU , λ, r,X>1 ,X>2 )
10: Z1 ← S1 −B1 · (LUR>U );Z2 ← S2 −B2 · (LUR>U );
11: R̂1 ← singleInverse(B1,L1, λ, r,Z1)
12: L̂1 ← singleInverse(B>1 ,R1, λ, r,Z>1 )
13: R̂2 ← singleInverse(B2,L2, λ, r,Z2)
14: L̂2 ← singleInverse(B>2 ,R2, λ, r,Z>2 )
15: end while
16: Â1 ← L̂UR̂>U + L̂1R̂>1 ; Â2 ← L̂UR̂>U + L̂2R̂>2 ;
17: Decrypt Â1 ← Â1 −DΨ /ψi,0; Â2 ← Â2 −DΨ /ψi,0;
Output: Â1 ← α1Â1; Â2 ← α2Â2;
Procedure Y = singleInverse(B,L, λ, r,X):
1: for i = 1 to t do
2: Pi ← [Diag(B(:, i))L;
√
λIr]; Qi ← [X(:, i); 0r]
3: Y (:, i) = (P>i Pi)\(P>i Qi)
Procedure Y = crossInverse(B1,B2,L, λ, r,X1,X2):
1: for i = 1 to t do
2: Pi ← [Diag(B1(:, i))L;Diag(B2(:, i))L;
√
λIr];
3: Qi ← [X1(:, i);X2(:, i); 0r]
4: Y (:, i) = (P>i Pi)\(P>i Qi)
problem in an iterative manner. In the Beginning, all L and R
matrices are initialized randomly except RU . Then, with LU
fixed, RU can be calculated from the initialized matrices by
solving the equation:
 B1 · (LUR>U )B2 · (LUR>U )√
λR>U
 =
 S1 · (L1R>1 )S2 · (L2R>2 )
0
 . (17)
Eqn.(17) can be treated as a linear least squares problem.
The inverse procedure crossInverse computes RU and LU .
The other L and R matrices are obtained by similar inverse
procedure singleInverse. Furthermore, in Alg.1, the rank
approximation r and the lagrange tradeoff coefficient λ are
influential in the accuracy of estimation. The key operation in
Alg.1 is the encryption, CS recovery with inverse computation,
and decryption. The KVP operation processes k + 1 vectors
with size 1×t in encryption and decryption procedures, which
both require complexity of O((k+ 1)t). The more complicate
task is CS computing, whose convergence to optimal requires
the complexity of O(nrt). Together, the algorithm requires
the computational complexity of O(knrtm), where m is the
iteration times.
Fig. 2: Comparisons for humidity, light of the IntelLab data.
Fig. 3: Comparisons for humidity, light of the GreenOrbs data.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
A. Evaluation Methodology
Ground Truth: Our datasets are from the IntelLab and
GreenOrbs projects. Two types of attributes are chosen in each
project: Indoor-humidity, Indoor-light, GreenOrbs-humidity,
GreenOrbs-light. We preprocess the original data in Section
II-D(1) to extract “ground truth” matrices.
Compared Methods: To verify the effectiveness of our
approach, two methods are chosen for comparison. They are
the classic method CS [5] and the state-of-the-art method,
PPCS [6].
Metric: We measure the normalized square error (NSE)
defined as follows:
NSE =
‖A− Â‖F
‖A‖F . (18)
B. Performance Results on Real Sensory Datasets
We randomly drop entries with missing data rate 10%,
20%, ..., 90%, i.e., with sampling rate 90%, 80%, ..., 10%.
After preprocessing the remaining data, i.e., outlier processing,
we apply the above four schemes for data recovery. Then we
conduct 15 iterations for each case and record the average
result over these 10 runs. From Figs. 2 and 3, we find that as
the sampling rate increases (or the data loss rate decreases), the
recovery errors for all the three methods decrease. PPCS-MAA
performs much better than PPCS, because PPCS does not
consider multiple attributes correlation. The performance of
PPCS-MAA is close to CS, which means our method satisfies
the demand of high accuracy in the condition of good privacy.
Generally, our scheme achieves recovery error ≤ 1% for
sampling rate ≥ 20% and almost exact recovery for sampling
rate ≥ 40%. Note that although PPCS performs as well as our
method in terms of privacy, its accuracy catches up with our
method only for sampling rate ≥ 40% due to the absence of
MAA. Fig. 2 shows the recovery performance for the IntelLab
data. For sampling rate 20%, 50%, 60%, and 70%, PPCS is
worse than PPCS-MAA. The recovery errors of PPCS and
PPCS-MAA decrease further with more samples, keeping pace
with the standard CS. They all converge to nearly zero recovery
error for sampling rate ≥ 70%. In Fig. 3, the results turn
out to be similar for GreenOrbs, except that PPCS performs
a little unsteadily. Comparing GreenOrbs with IntelLab data,
we observe bigger gaps between PPCS and PPCS-MAA/CS.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the data privacy is-
sue in the presence of sensory data recovery with multiple
attributes. After we discussed the drawback of existing works,
an effective privacy-preserving recovery service was modeled.
From the datasets in WSNs, we mined the low-rank feature
and multi-attribute correlation. Driven by these observations,
a PPCS-MAA approach was proposed to accurately recover
the missing data, which included the privacy preservation to
compressive sensing with multi-attribute assistance. Given the
theoretical results of analysis of accuracy and complexity, our
scheme is as accurate as standard CS completion methods.
The proposed algorithm not only effectively preserves the data
privacy with satisfying recovery accuracy, but also combines
multiple attributes recovery system which will help to control
cost or data trading. Data-driven simulations illustrate that the
approach is expected to have wide real-world applications.
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